Involving IDPs in the Darfur peace process by Lanz, David
IDPs were only marginally involved in the protracted 
negotiations in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, which after 
seven rounds of talks concluded with the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The DPA has not been 
implemented and it may have made things worse. The 
Abuja process was deeply flawed, a textbook example 
of how not to arrange peace negotiations. The final text1 
was written entirely by the African Union mediation team 
and its Arabic version made available to the parties only a 
few days before the expiration of an unrealistic deadline 
imposed by the UN Security Council. In order to close 
the deal, high-level representatives from the US and UK 
flew into Abuja to twist arms. No space was given for 
the parties to shape the agreement or to get input from 
their constituencies. In the end, the Sudanese government 
and Minni Minawi (the leader of a faction of the Sudan 
Liberation army/Movement – SLA/M – one of the main 
rebel groups locked in conflict with the government) 
signed while Abdel Wahid, Minawi’s rival and the 
original leader of SLA/M, and Khalil Ibrahim, leader of 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused. 
The Abuja talks were not inclusive. While some civil 
society groups were present, their degree of independence 
and representativeness was highly questionable. 
IDPs in Darfur were neither informed nor consulted. 
Within a few days of signing, large and at times violent 
demonstrations against the DPA erupted in camps across 
Darfur. IDPs complained that the agreement did not 
sufficiently address their security concerns, nor provide 
adequate compensation for those who have lost their 
houses and land in the course of the conflict. The protests 
were probably encouraged by Abdel Wahid and his 
supporters among the Fur – Darfur’s largest non-Arab 
group. However, it was clear that all IDPs, regardless 
of their tribal origin, felt that the DPA did not address 
their concerns and were angry at their exclusion.
Their frustration highlights the main recommendation 
arising from a recent report from the Brookings-Bern 
Project on Internal Displacement. ‘Addressing Internal 
Displacement in Peace Processes’2 makes a general case for 
involving IDPs in peace processes. There are three specific 
reasons why this is crucially important in Darfur: the 
massive scale of the displacement; the centrality of land 
dispossession in conflict and any long-term resolution; 
and the politicisation of IDP camps as a result of efforts 
by the government of Sudan and the rebel movements 
to win support and secure military advantage. 
Involving IDPs in the Darfur peace process is not 
idealism or part of an activist agenda. It is based on the 
pragmatic realisation – and lessons learnt from the DPA 
– that sustainable peace will only be possible if concrete 
solutions are found for IDPs. Their needs must be 
satisfied and they must feel they are integrally involved. 
The UN Special Envoy to Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and his 
AU counterpart, the Tanzanian diplomat Salim Ahmed 
Salim, seem to have understood this. In the beginning 
of their post-Abuja re-launch of the peace process, they 
made a deliberate effort to reach out to IDPs. They 
visited camps and held talks with IDP representatives 
so as to better grasp their interests and expectations. 
There now seems to be consensus on the principle that 
IDPs do need to be a part of the peace process. The real 
difficulty, however, is figuring out how to involve them. 
Multi-track diplomacy
Peace processes consist of multiple actors and ‘tracks’. 
Track One diplomacy refers to official negotiations 
between conflict parties; Track Two involves unofficial 
interactions between influential actors from civil society; 
and Track Three covers grassroots conflict resolution 
initiatives. The challenge in Darfur and elsewhere is to 
combine different tracks and to ensure complementarity. 
Following the failure in late October 2007 of peace talks 
in the Libyan city of Sirte, Eliasson and Salim now face 
the challenge of developing a multi-track approach that 
satisfies the needs of IDPs without jeopardising the 
process. Logically, it seems desirable to give IDPs a seat 
at the negotiating table. However, as Donald Steinberg, 
Vice President of the International Crisis Group, points 
out: “there may be occasions where it is wise to include 
only the principal armed parties in the initial stages of 
a peace negotiation, as long as it is clear that the voices 
of other key actors – including IDP representatives 
– will be heard and heeded shortly thereafter.”3 
In Darfur, the formal inclusion of IDPs in official 
peace talks raises two significant problems. Given 
their lack of experience, IDP representatives would be 
susceptible to manipulation. They could become proxies 
in a power struggle between the government and the 
rebel movements, unable to independently defend the 
interests of their constituents. Furthermore, it would be 
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very difficult to identify legitimate IDP representatives. 
A microcosm of Darfuri society, IDPs are extremely 
heterogeneous – divided regionally, politically and 
between tribes. Selecting a small number to represent 
IDPs at peace talks could exacerbate tensions. 
An alternative to direct Track One participation is to 
establish a parallel civil society forum for IDPs and other 
civil society groups. This forum – and its component 
thematic working groups – could work alongside official 
negotiators. Its decision-making power and coordination 
with Track One negotiations would have to be clarified. A 
parallel civil society forum would enhance the legitimacy 
of the peace talks, provide valuable thematic input and 
keep parties in check, preventing them from negotiating 
an incomplete and unsustainable pact between warring 
elites. The selection of IDP and civil society representatives 
remains tricky but, given that the parallel forum could 
accommodate a relatively large number of delegates, the 
AU-UN joint mediation team should be able to manage it.
Parallel Track Two initiatives are crucial. These should 
involve IDPs alongside other local government 
officials, tribal leaders, academics, partners of Sudanese 
and international humanitarian organisations, and 
representatives of women and youth groups. They 
would meet on a regular basis to exchange views and 
build trust. They could help the high-level mediators 
build grassroots support for the peace talks. The Civil 
Affairs Section of UNMIS has suggested that Track Two 
meetings be held separately for IDPs, tribal leaders 
and other civil society groups in each of Darfur’s three 
regional capitals – El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala. Their 
precise structure as well as the lead organiser is yet to 
be decided. What matters is that Track Two initiatives 
complement official negotiations and that those who 
participate are as representative and independent as 
possible. It will also be important to ensure their safety.
Eliasson and Salim should engage IDPs as frequently 
and regularly as possible in the build-up to any actual 
peace talks. AU-UN mediators need to travel to IDP 
camps, interact with camp leaders, brief them of 
higher-level developments and ensure their input. 
Transparency and regular dissemination of information 
are particularly important if the peace talks take 
place outside of Darfur. Otherwise it will be easy for 
opportunistic rebel leaders to spread misinformation 
and mobilise IDP opinion against them. It will also be 
important not to arouse unrealistic expectations of what 
peace negotiations can achieve. Otherwise, the UN and 
AU will lose credibility among IDPs in the long run.
If a peace deal is reached, it is likely that details about 
implementation will be determined by a range of oversight 
committees focusing on property claims, compensation, 
disarmament and reconstruction projects. These matters 
are of direct concern for IDPs and Darfuri civil society 
and they must be given real decision-making powers.
Conclusion
Whether a peace deal will be reached remains highly 
uncertain. The rebel movements are fragmented, the 
Sudanese government is reluctant to re-negotiate the DPA 
and the international community is struggling to adopt 
a common position. However, there is no alternative 
to negotiating. A Kosovo-like military intervention, as 
demanded by some Darfur advocates, is unlikely to 
materialise and even if it did would probably make 
matters worse in the long run. Sustainable peace in 
Darfur has to be the result of a legitimate political 
process, built on a compromise that takes into account 
the needs of all stakeholders, particularly IDPs. The 
AU-UN mediators appear to have learned from the 
failure of the DPA, and their effort to reach out to 
IDPs is encouraging. However, the involvement of 
IDPs needs to be broadened and their participation 
acknowledged as an intrinsic part of the peace process. 
Otherwise, a chance for peace may be squandered.
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